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Abstract
We study monetary and ﬁscal policy games in a dynamic sticky price
economy where monetary policy sets nominal interest rates and ﬁscal pol-
icy provides public goods ﬁnanced with distortionary labor taxes. We
compare the Ramsey outcome to non-cooperative policy regimes where
one or both policymakers lack commitment power. Absence of ﬁscal com-
mitment gives rise to a public spending bias, while lack of monetary com-
mitment generates the well-known inﬂation bias. An appropriately con-
servative monetary authority can eliminate the steady state distortions
generated by lack of monetary commitment and may even eliminate the
distortions generated by lack of ﬁscal commitment. The costs associated
with the central bank being overly conservative seem small, but insuﬃ-
cient conservatism may result in sizable welfare losses.
Keywords: optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy, sequential policy, dis-
cretionary policy, time consistent policy, conservative monetary policy
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The diﬃculties associated with executing optimal but time-inconsistent policy
plans have received much attention following the seminal work of Kydland and
Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). Time inconsistency problems,
however, have hardly been analyzed in a dynamic setting where monetary and
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1ﬁscal policymakers are separate authorities engaged in a non-cooperative policy
game. This may appear surprising given that the institutional setup in most
developed countries suggests such an analysis to be of relevance.
In this paper we analyze non-cooperative monetary and ﬁscal policy games
assuming that policymakers cannot commit to future policy choices. We identify
the policy biases emerging from sequential and non-cooperative decision making
and assess the desirability of installing a central bank that is conservative in the
sense of Rogoﬀ (1985). In other terms, we analyze the desirability of central
bank conservatism in a setting with endogenous ﬁscal policy.
Presented is a dynamic sticky price economy without capital along the lines
of Rotemberg (1982) and Woodford (2003) where output is ineﬃciently low due
to market power by ﬁrms. The economy features two independent policymakers,
i.e., a ﬁscal authority deciding about the level of public goods provision and a
monetary authority determining the short-term nominal interest rate. Public
goods generate utility for private agents and are ﬁnanced by distortionary labor
taxes under a balanced budget constraint. Monetary and ﬁscal authorities are
assumed benevolent, i.e., maximize the utility of the representative agent.
The natural starting point for our analysis is the Ramsey allocation, which
assumes full policy commitment and cooperation among monetary and ﬁscal
policymakers. The Ramsey allocation is second-best and thus provides a useful
benchmark against which one can assess the welfare costs of sequential and
non-cooperative policymaking.
In the presence of sticky prices and monopolistic competition monetary and
ﬁscal authorities both face a time-inconsistency problem. While price setters
are forward-looking, policymakers that decide sequentially fail to perceive the
implications of their current policy decisions on past price setting decisions, since
past prices can be taken as given at the time policy is determined. As a result,
policymakers underestimate the welfare costs of generating inﬂation today and
ﬁnd it attractive to try to move output closer to its ﬁrst-best level. Sequential
monetary policy, e.g., seeks to lower real interest rates so as to increase private
consumption and output. Similarly, sequential ﬁscal policy ﬁnds it optimal to
increase output via increased spending on public goods.
We then characterize the non-cooperative Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium
where both policymakers determine their policies sequentially.1 To discover
the implications of relaxing monetary and ﬁscal commitment, it is useful to
proceed in steps. In particular, we ﬁrst consider intermediate equilibria where
one policymaker can commit while the other behaves in accordance with the
reaction function that would be optimal in the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium.
These intermediate cases are self-conﬁrming equilibria, rather than strict Nash
1Markov-perfect Nash equilibria are a standard reﬁnement used in the applied dynamic
games literature, e.g., Klein et al. (2004).
2equilibria, but prove helpful for understanding the biases emerging in a situation
where both policymakers act sequentially.2 In addition, they provide natural
benchmarks for assessing the welfare gains from monetary conservatism.
First, we consider an intermediate regime with sequential ﬁscal policy (SFP)
and monetary commitment. We show that, provided monetary policy imple-
ments price stability, sequential ﬁscal policy engages in excessive public spend-
ing. Yet, the ﬁscal spending becomes less severe as inﬂation rises and this in-
duces a fully committed monetary authority to allow for positive inﬂation rates.
This interaction between a commited monetary authority and a sequential ﬁscal
authority indicates that an overly conservative central bank may potentially be
harmful, since it ampliﬁes ﬁscal policy distortions.
We then consider the reverse situation with sequential monetary policy
(SMP) but time zero commitment by the ﬁscal authority. Sequential mone-
tary policy is shown to generate the familiar inﬂation bias. Since a reduction
in public spending can reduce the size of the monetary inﬂation bias, a com-
mitted ﬁscal authority deviates from the Ramsey solution in the self-conﬁrming
equilibrium by spending and taxing less.
Finally, we determine the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium with sequential
monetary and sequential ﬁscal policy (SMFP). This equilibrium features an
inﬂation bias as well as a government spending bias, and tends to cause welfare
losses that are considerably larger than in either the SFP or SMP regime. We
then investigate whether a conservative central bank, that maximizes a weighted
sum of an inﬂation loss term and the representative agent’s utility, is able to
avoid the steady state welfare losses generated by sequential monetary policy.
In models that abstract from ﬁscal policy or in which ﬁscal policy is exogenous,
central bank conservatism has been shown to be an eﬀective tool for eliminating
the policy biases generated by lack of monetary commitment, e.g., Rogoﬀ (1985)
and Svensson (1997). We show that these results fully extend to a setting with
endogenous ﬁscal policy. Moreover, with endogenous ﬁscal policy a conservative
monetary authority may undo not only the distortions generated by lack of
monetary commitment but potentially also those stemming from lack of ﬁscal
commitment.
More speciﬁcally, with sequential monetary and ﬁscal policy, an appropri-
ate degree of monetary conservatism is found to recoup at least the losses from
lack of monetary commitment. Welfare in the resulting Markov-perfect Nash
equilibrium increases from the level associated with SMFP to that with SFP, or
even further. When ﬁscal policy is determined before monetary policy, a con-
servative monetary authority could even undo the steady state losses associated
2See Fudenberg and Levine (1993) or Sargent (1999) for an account of the concept of
‘self-conﬁrming equilibrium’.
3with lack of ﬁscal commitment. Suﬃcient monetary conservatism then approx-
imately implements the Ramsey steady state, even though both policymakers
lack commitment power.
Although determining the optimal degree of monetary conservatism might
be diﬃcult in practice, we ﬁnd the losses associated with suboptimal degrees
of conservatism to be fairly asymmetric. While an overly conservative central
bank ampliﬁes the ﬁscal spending bias, we ﬁnd the associated welfare losses to
be fairly small for the considered model calibrations. At the same time, the
inﬂation bias associated with insuﬃcient monetary conservatism gives rise to
substantial welfare losses.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. After discussing the
related literature in section 2, section 3 introduces the economic model and
derives the implementability constraints. Section 4 presents the monetary and
ﬁscal policy regimes with and without commitment and analytically interprets
the steady state biases. After calibrating the model in section 5, section 6
provides a quantitative assessment of the steady state eﬀects generated by the
various policy regimes under consideration. The case of a conservative central
bank is analyzed in section 7. A conclusion brieﬂy summarizes the results and
provides an outlook for future work.
2 Related Literature
Problems of optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy are traditionally studied within
the optimal taxation framework introduced by Frank Ramsey (1927). In the
so-called Ramsey literature, monetary and ﬁscal authorities are treated as a
‘single’ authority and decisions are taken at time zero, e.g., Chari and Kehoe
(1998). In seminal contributions, Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983) show that time zero optimal choices might be time-inconsistent,
i.e., reoptimization in successive periods would suggest a diﬀerent policy to be
optimal than the one initially envisaged.
The monetary policy literature has extensively studies time-inconsistency
problems in dynamic settings and potential solutions to it, e.g., Rogoﬀ (1985),
Svensson (1997) and Walsh (1995). However, in this literature ﬁscal policy
is typically absent or assumed exogenous to the model. Similarly, a number
of contributions analyze sequential ﬁscal decisions and the time-consistency of
optimal ﬁscal plans in dynamic general equilibrium models, e.g., Lucas and
Stokey (1983), Chari and Kehoe (1990) or Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2004).
This literature typically studies real models without money.
An important strand of the literature, developed by Sargent and Wallace
(1981), Leeper (1991), and Woodford (1998b), studies monetary and ﬁscal policy
interactions using policy rules, e.g., Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b). This
4literature, however, does not consider optimal policy and time-inconsistency
problems, as it assumes policymakers to be fully committed to simple rules.
A range of papers discusses monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions with and
without commitment in a static framework where monetary and ﬁscal policy-
makers interact only once. Alesina and Tabellini (1987), e.g., consider a model
where the monetary authority chooses the inﬂation rate and the ﬁscal author-
i t ys e t st h et a xr a t et oﬁnance government expenditure. When policymakers
disagree about the trade-oﬀ between output and inﬂation, then monetary com-
mitment may not be welfare improving. Reduced seigniorage leads to increased
ﬁscal taxation and this might more than compensate the gains from reduced
inﬂation. Instead, our paper considers a cashless limit economy so abstracts
from seigniorage as a source of government revenue.
In a series of papers Dixit and Lambertini investigate the interaction between
monetary and ﬁscal policymakers with and without commitment. Namely, Dixit
and Lambertini (2001, 2003b) analyze the case of a monetary union but in a set-
ting where the monetary authority does not face a time-inconsistency problem.
Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) consider a situation where monetary and ﬁscal
policymakers are both subject to a time-inconsistency problem. While the ﬁscal
authority maximizes social welfare, the monetary authority has a more conserv-
ative output and inﬂation target and does not take into account the distortions
generated by ﬁscal policy instruments. In such a setting, monetary commit-
ment is ‘negated’ by sequential ﬁscal policy, i.e., the equilibrium outcome with
monetary commitment turns out to be the same as in the case with sequential
monetary leadership.
This paper goes beyond these earlier contributions by studying a dynamic
model where current economic outcomes are inﬂuenced also by expectations on
future policy. Recently, Díaz-Giménez et al. (2004) study sequential monetary
policy in a cash-in-advance economy with government debt. They consider a
ﬂexible price economy with exogenous ﬁscal spending and study the implications
of indexed and nominal debt for monetary policy choices with and without
commitment. Interactions between monetary and ﬁscal policy in their model
operate through the government budget constraint and the seigniorage revenues
raised by monetary policy. Our paper abstracts from seigniorage as a source
of government revenue and instead considers the interactions arising from the
presence of nominal rigidities.
3 The Economy
The next sections introduce a sticky price economy model, similar to the one
studied in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a), and derive the private sector equi-
librium for given monetary and ﬁscal policy choices.
53.1 Private Sector




βtu(ct,h t,g t) (1)
where ct denotes consumption of an aggregate consumption good, ht ∈ [0,1]
denotes the labor supply, and gt public goods provision by the government in
the form of aggregate consumption goods. Throughout the paper we impose
the following conditions.
Condition 1 u(c,h,g) is separable in c, h, g and uc > 0, ucc < 0, uh < 0,
uhh ≤ 0, ug > 0, ugg < 0.
Each household produces a diﬀerentiated intermediate good. Demand for





where yt denotes (private and public) demand for the aggregate good, e Pt is the
price of the good produced by the household, and Pt is the price of the aggregate





where η<−1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between the goods of diﬀer-
ent households. The household chooses e Pt then hires the necessary amount of
labor e ht to satisfy the resulting product demand, i.e.,




Following Rotemberg (1982) we describe sluggish nominal price adjustment by


























6where Bt denotes nominal bonds that pay BtRt in period t +1 , wt is the real
wage paid in a competitive labor market, and τt is a labor income tax.3
Although bonds are the only available ﬁnancial instrument, assuming com-
plete ﬁnancial markets instead would make no diﬀerence for the analysis, since
households have identical incomes in a symmetric price setting equilibrium. One
should note that we also abstract from money holdings. This should be inter-
preted as the ‘cashless limit’ of an economy with money, see Woodford (1998a).
Money thus imposes only a lower bound on the gross nominal interest rate, i.e.,
Rt ≥ 1 (4)
each period. Abstracting from money entails that we ignore seigniorage revenues
generated in the presence of positive nominal interest rates. Given the size of
these revenues in relation to GDP in industrialized economies, this does not
seem to be an important omission for the analysis conducted here.4












The household’s problem consists of choosing {ct,h t,e ht, e Pt,B t}∞
t=0 so as to
maximize (1) subject to (2), (3), and (5) taking as given {yt,P t,w t,R t,g t,τ t}.
Using equation (2) to substitute e ht in (3) and letting the multiplier on (3) be
λt/Pt,t h eﬁrst order conditions of the household’s problem are then equations
(2), (3), and (5) holding with equality and also
uc(ct,h t,g t)=λt (6)

























3Considering income or consumption taxes, instead, would be equivalent to a labor income
tax plus a lump sum tax (on proﬁts). An earlier version of the paper, which is available upon
request, considered the case with lump sum taxes.
4As emphasized by Leeper (1991), however, in a stochastic model seigniorage may never-
theless be an important marginal source of revenue. Since our paper abstracts from shocks,















which has to hold each period.
3.2 Government
The government consists of two authorities, a monetary authority choosing
short-term nominal interest rates and a ﬁscal authority deciding on government
expenditures and labor income taxes.
Government expenditures consist of spending related to the provision of
public goods gt and socially wasteful expenditure x that does not generate
utility for private agents. The level of public goods provision gt is a choice
variable, while x is taken to be exogenous.








+ gt + x − τtwtht
To simplify the analysis we eliminate government debt as a state variable by
assuming that the government budget is balanced period-by-period and that
B−1 =0 .5 The government budget constraint then reduces to
τtwtht = gt + x (10)
Importantly, the assumption of a balanced budget is not restrictive, since we
limit attention to the steady state of the economy. Assuming B−1 =0 ,h o w -
ever, implies that we abstract from monetary and ﬁscal interactions that operate
through the government budget constraint, as analyzed by Díaz-Giménez et al.
(2004). In particular, we ignore the monetary inﬂation bias arising from the
attempt to decrease the real value of outstanding government debt with ‘sur-
prise’ inﬂation. Abstracting from nominal debt thus implies that we understate
the size of the monetary inﬂation bias and the role for a conservative monetary
authority. In future work we plan to explore the eﬀects of incorporating also
government debt dynamics.
We note that the absence of government debt could also be interpreted as
the ﬁscal authority not being able to commit to repay outstanding debt in
the future. Moreover, abstracting from debt insures that the no Ponzi scheme
constraint (5) and the transversality constraint (9) are always satisﬁed.
5Fiscal policy is thus ‘passive’ in the sense of Leeper (1991).
83.3 Private Sector Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium the relative price is given by rt =1for all t.U s i n g
the government budget constraint (10), the ﬁrst order conditions of households
can be condensed into the following price setting equation












+ βEt [uc,t+1(Πt+1 − 1)Πt+1] (11)









Conveniently, the previous equations do not make reference to taxes and real
wages, while equations (6), (7), and (10) imply
τt =
gt + xt











A rational expectations equilibrium is then a set of plans {ct,h t,P t} satis-




(Πt − 1)2 + gt + x = ht (15)
given the policies {gt,R t ≥ 1},t h ev a l u eo fx, and the initial conditions B−1 =0
and P−1.
4M o n e t a r y a n d F i s c a l P o l i c y R e g i m e s
This section introduces the policy regimes analyzed in the remaining part of the
paper. We consider policymakers that maximize the utility of the representative
agent. While the descriptive realism of this assumption is open to debate,
importantly it allows us to identify the ineﬃciencies generated by sequential
policy decisions.
4.1 Ramsey Policy
As a benchmark we consider the Ramsey equilibrium, which assumes commit-
ment to policies at time zero and full cooperation between monetary and ﬁscal
9policymakers. The Ramsey equilibrium is second-best and given by the solution







βtu(ct,h t,g t) (16)
s.t.
Equations (11),(12),(15) for all t
Rt ≥ 1 for all t
The Ramsey planner thus maximizes the utility function of the representative
agent subject to the implementability constraints (11) and (12), the feasibil-
ity constraint (15), and the lower bound on nominal interest rates.6 We thus
propose the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 (Ramsey) A Ramsey equilibrium is a sequence {ct,h t,Πt,R t,g t}∞
t=0
solving problem (16).
Since optimal policy is time-inconsistent, the Ramsey equilibrium is initially
non-stationary. We will abstract from initial non-stationarities by deﬁning a
Ramsey steady state as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 (Ramsey SS) Let {ct,h t,Πt,R t,g t}∞
t=0 be a Ramsey equilibrium,
then the Ramsey steady state is given by limt→∞(ct,h t,Πt,R t,g t).
One should note that the Ramsey steady state corresponds to the ‘timeless
perspective’ commitment solution of Woodford (2003).
4.2 Sequential Policymaking
We now consider separate monetary and ﬁscal authorities that cannot commit
to future policy plans at time zero but rather decide upon policies at the time
of implementation, i.e., period-by-period.
To facilitate the exposition we assume that a sequentially deciding policy-
maker takes as given the current policy choice of the other policymaker as well
as all future policy choices and future private sector choices. We prove the
rationality of this assumption at the end of this section.
6The balanced budget constraint (10) and the initial condition B−1 =0are implicit in
the Phillips curve (11). The initial condition P−1 can be ignored as it only normalizes the
resulting price path.
104.2.1 Sequential Fiscal Policy
We consider here sequential ﬁscal policymaking. Given the assumptions made






βju(ct+j,h t+j,g t+j) (17)
s.t.
Equations (11),(12),(15) for all t
Rt given
Et (ct+j,h t+j,Πt+j,g t+j,R t+j) given for j ≥ 1
Rt+j ≥ 1 for all j ≥ 0
Eliminating Lagrange multipliers, the ﬁrst order conditions associated with




















Interestingly, for Πt =1the ﬁscal reaction function simpliﬁes to7
ug,t = −uh,t (18)
Thus, provided monetary policy implements price stability, discretionary ﬁscal
policy equates the marginal utility of public consumption to the marginal disu-
tility of work. Clearly, this leads to a suboptimally high level of public spending
because condition (18) fails to take into account that
1. ﬁscal taxation has a negative wealth eﬀect that crowds out private con-
sumption;
2. public consumption is ﬁnanced with labor income taxes, which distort the
labor supply decision.
Both of these eﬀects are ignored by the ﬁscal authority, since the current
monetary policy choice and all future choices are taken as given so the Euler
equation (12) suggests that private consumption is determined. This makes it
optimal to equate the marginal utility of public consumption to the marginal
disutility of work.




7For Πt =1the Lagrange multiplier on the Phillips curve (11) is zero in problem (17).
11which shows that, ceteris paribus, the ﬁscal spending bias is less severe with
positive inﬂation rates. For Πt > 1 the marginal resource costs of generating
additional inﬂation through increased ﬁscal spending fail to be zero, see equation
(15). Fiscal policy takes these costs into account and reduces public spending
correspondingly.8
The previous result suggests that a conservative monetary authority that
implements price stability may increase the distortion generated by sequential
ﬁscal policy decisions. The distortions generated by monetary conservatism are
even larger, if monetary conservatism also leads to reduced labor input.
4.2.2 Sequential Monetary Policy
We now consider sequential monetary policy. Given the assumptions made






βju(ct+j,h t+j,g t+j) (20)
s.t.
Equations (11),(12),(15) for all t
gt given
Et (ct+j,h t+j,Πt+j,g t+j,R t+j) given for j ≥ 1 (21)
Rt+j ≥ 1 for all j ≥ 0 (22)
































Monetary policy sets the nominal interest rate Rt such that MRF is satisﬁed
each period. Appendix A.1 proves the following result
Lemma 1 Provided the discount factor β is suﬃciently close to 1, satisfying
MRF requires a strictly positive steady state inﬂation rate.
Sequential monetary policy generates the familiar inﬂation bias, e.g., Barro
and Gordon (1983). Intuitively, monetary policy is tempted to stimulate de-
mand by reducing interest rates. Since price adjustments are costly, the price
8For Πt < 1 the ﬁscal bias is larger because higher ﬁscal spending increases inﬂation,
thereby reduces the resource costs of inﬂation. Interestingly, inﬂation could continue to have
am o d e r a t i n ge ﬀect on ﬁscal spending as prices become ﬂexible (θ → 0). While the marginal
costs of generating additional inﬂation decrease as θ → 0, the Phillips curve (11) implies that
any given increase in government spending generates larger and larger inﬂation.
12level will not fully adjust to the demand increase. At the same time, nominal
wages are ﬂexible and can increase so as to induce the additional labor supply
required to serve the demand increase. While the resulting real wage increase
generates inﬂation, see the Phillips curve (11) and equation (14), the welfare
costs of generating inﬂation are not fully taken into account, for reasons dis-
cussed before. Ultimately, monetary policy increases real wages and inﬂation
to the point where the marginal utility of an additional unit of consumption is
equal to the marginal disutility of work and the perceived costs of inﬂation.
4.2.3 Sequential Monetary and Fiscal Policy
We are now in a position to deﬁne a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium with
sequential monetary and ﬁscal policy (SMFP).
We ﬁrst verify the rationality of our initial assumption that future choices
can be taken as given. The private sector optimality conditions, (11) and (12),
the feasibility constraint (15), as well as the policy reactions functions (FRF)
and (MRF) all depend on current and future variables only. This suggests the
existence of an equilibrium where current play depends on current and future
economic conditions only and justiﬁes taking as given future equilibrium play.
If, in addition, monetary and ﬁscal policies are determined simultaneously each
period, Nash equilibrium requires to take the other players’ decisions as given.
This rationalizes all of our assumptions and provides the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3 (SMFP) A Markov-perfect equilibrium with sequential monetary
and ﬁscal policy is a sequence {ct,h t,Πt,R t,g t}∞
t=0 solving equations (11),(12),(15),
(FRF) and (MRF).
A steady state with SMFP is a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium (c,h,Π,R,g).
We now show that assuming Stackelberg leadership by one of the policy
authorities, instead of simultaneous decision making, does not aﬀect the equi-
librium outcome.
While the policy problem of the Stackelberg follower remains unchanged,
the Stackelberg leader must take into account the reaction function of the fol-
lower and maximize over all policy choices. Importantly, however, the Lagrange
multipliers associated with imposing MRF on the sequential ﬁscal problem (17)
or with imposing FRF on sequential monetary problem (20) are zero. This fol-
lows from the fact that these reaction functions can be derived from the ﬁrst
order conditions of the leader’s policy problem even when the follower’s reaction
function is not being imposed.
Intuitively, the leadership structure does not matter for the equilibrium out-
come because monetary and ﬁscal policymakers pursue the same objectives.
Diﬀerences to the Ramsey solution thus arise exclusively by relaxing the as-
sumption of commitment. The non-cooperative aspect of monetary and ﬁscal
13policy interactions, and the sequence of moves, will matter only in section 7
when we introduce a central bank that is more inﬂa t i o na v e r s et h a nt h eﬁscal
authority.
From Lemma 1 and the MRF, the steady state with sequential monetary
and ﬁscal policy features an inﬂation bias, i.e., Π > 1.W h e t h e rt h e r ei sa l s oa
positive ﬁscal spending bias depends on the severity of the inﬂation bias. For
inﬂation rates close to one, public spending will be larger than in the Ramsey
steady state, see the discussion in section 4.2.1; yet, for suﬃciently high steady
state inﬂation rates one cannot exclude that ﬁscal spending falls short of the
Ramsey steady state level.
4.3 Intermediate Cases
As mentioned earlier, it is helpful to consider also intermediate cases where
one policymaker can commit but the other behaves according to its sequential
reaction function.
In the case with monetary commitment, the monetary authority internalizes
the ﬁscal reaction function (FRF). The monetary policy problem at time zero






βtu(ct,h t,g t) (23)
s.t.
Equations (11),(12),(15),(FRF) for all t
Rt ≥ 1 for all t
We can provide the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4 (SFP) As e l f - c o n ﬁrming equilibrium with sequential ﬁscal policy
and monetary commitment is a sequence {ct,h t,Πt,R t,g t}∞
t=0 solving problem
(23).
We note that the solution to problem (23) fails to be a Markov-perfect Nash
equilibrium because the derivation of the FRF assumes the ﬁscal authority takes
future monetary policy decisions as given. Under commitment the monetary
authority, however, can condition current play on past play of the ﬁscal authority
and rationality requires the ﬁscal agent to take this fully into account.9 By
taking future play as given, the ﬁscal authority fails to correctly anticipate
the oﬀ-equilibrium behavior of monetary authority. At the same time, the
ﬁscal authority holds rational beliefs about equilibrium play, which implies that
9When the sequential authority is rational in this sence, it is easy to show that the com-
miting player can sustain the Ramsey outcome via appropriate trigger strategies.
14beliefs are never contradicted by outcomes. The solution to (23) is thus still a
self-conﬁrming equilibrium, see Fudenberg and Levine (1993) or Sargent (1999).
As in the Ramsey case, a steady state with sequential ﬁscal policy (SFP) is
deﬁned as the limit for t →∞of the self-conﬁrming equilibrium with SFP.
With ﬁscal commitment and sequential monetary policy (SMP), ﬁscal policy







βtu(ct,h t,g t) (24)
s.t.
Equations (11),(12),(15),(MRF) for all t
Rt ≥ 1 for all t
We thus have the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5 (SMP) As e l f - c o n ﬁrming equilibrium with sequential monetary
policy and ﬁscal commitment is a sequence {ct,h t,Πt,R t,g t}∞
t=0 solving problem
(24).
A steady state with sequential monetary policy (SMP) is deﬁned as the limit
for t →∞of the self-conﬁrming equilibrium with SMP.
5 Model Calibration
To assess the quantitative relevance of the policy biases associated with the






+ ω0 log(1 − ht)+ω1 log(gt) (25)
where ω0 > 0, ω1 ≥ 0 and σ>0. We then calibrate the model as is summarized
in table 1.
The quarterly discount factor is chosen to match the average ex-post U.S.
real interest rate, 3.5%, during the period 1983:1-2002:4. The value for the
elasticity of demand implies a gross mark-up equal to 1.2, and consumption
utility is assumed logarithmic. The values of ω0 and ω1 are chosen such that
in the Ramsey steady state agents work 20% of their time and spend 20% of
output on public goods.10 The price stickiness parameter is chosen such that the
10The values of ω0 and ω1 are set according to equations (32) and (38), resepectively, derived
in appendix A.2.
15log-linearized version of the Phillips curve (11) is consistent with the estimates
of Sbordone (2002), as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a). We abstract from
wasteful ﬁscal spending.
To test the robustness of our results, we consider also alternative model
parameterizations. And to increase comparability across parameterizations, the
values of the utility parameters ω0 and ω1 are adjusted in a way that the Ramsey
steady state remains unaﬀected.
6 Steady State Outcomes
Using the calibrated model from the previous section, we now investigate the
quantitative impact of the various policy arrangements on the endogenous vari-
ables and welfare. The robustness of the results to various changes in the para-
meterization of the model is also discussed.
Table 2 summarizes the steady state eﬀects of the diﬀerent policy arrange-
ments on private consumption, working hours, ﬁscal spending, and inﬂation
rates, with variables expressed in terms of percentage deviations from the Ram-
s e ys t e a d ys t a t e . 11 The table also reports the steady state tax level and welfare
losses. The latter are expressed as the percentage reduction in private consump-
tion that would entail the Ramsey steady state to be welfare equivalent to the
considered policy regime.
First, consider the sequential ﬁscal policy regime (SFP) in table 2. As sug-
gested by the discussion in section 4.2.1, sequential ﬁscal decisions result in
excessive ﬁscal spending and a crowding out of private consumption. Despite
monetary commitment, the monetary authority allows for positive rates of in-
ﬂation. This for two reasons. On the one hand, inﬂation is associated with an
increase in the real wage. This helps to sustain labor supply and ameliorates
the ﬁscal spending bias, since ﬁscal policy (approximately) equates the marginal
disutility of labor to the marginal utility of private consumption, see equation
(18). On the other hand, with positive inﬂation rates the marginal costs of creat-
ing additional inﬂation is positive and this restrains ﬁscal spending, see equation
(19). Despite monetary commitment, the welfare losses from sequential ﬁscal
policy are substantial, i.e., 6.5% of Ramsey steady state consumption.
Second, consider the opposite case with sequential monetary policy and ﬁs-
cal commitment (SMP). This arrangement generates the familiar inﬂation bias
associated with sequential monetary policy decisions in sticky price economies,
see the corresponding row in table 2. Monetary policy thereby increases real
wages and the inﬂation rate to the point where the perceived marginal costs of
inﬂation and the disutility of supplying additional labor balance the marginal
utility of private consumption. Fiscal policy can reduce the incentives to inﬂate
11In the Ramsey steady state c =0 .16, h =0 .2, g =0 .04, Π =1 ,a n dτ =0 .24.
16by reducing public consumption and taxes. These measures increase private
consumption and working hours and thus dampen the monetary inﬂation bias.
Yet, despite ﬁscal commitment the welfare losses from sequential monetary pol-
icy are sizable and of about the same size as those generated by sequential ﬁscal
policy.
Finally, consider the case with sequential monetary and ﬁscal policy (SMFP)
in table 2. In this setting a ﬁscal spending bias as well as an inﬂation bias
emerge. Since inﬂation is associated with a labor supply increase and a rise in
the marginal disutility of work, the ﬁscal spending bias turns out to be smaller
than with sequential ﬁscal policy alone (SFP). The losses generated by both pol-
icymakers acting sequentially, however, are much larger than in the case where
only one policymaker lacks commitment power. This illustrates that commit-
ment by one authority alone would generate sizable welfare gains. Importantly,
inﬂation with SMFP turns out to be higher than in the case with SFP. This
suggests that an appropriately conservative monetary authority may be able to
improve welfare.
Table 3 explores the robustness of these ﬁndings to diﬀerent parameteriza-
tions of the model.12 The table reports the welfare losses associated with the
various policy regimes and the change in inﬂation resulting from a relaxation of
monetary commitment in a situation with sequential ﬁscal policy.
The ﬁndings are fairly robust to assuming higher or lower degrees of nomi-
nal rigidity (θ =1 0 ,25). In particular, large welfare losses arise when relaxing
monetary commitment in the presence of sequential ﬁscal policy. Moreover,
lack of monetary commitment still leads to a sizable increase in equilibrium
inﬂation, see the last column of table 3. In the ﬂexible price limit (θ → 0),
however, the time-inconsistency problems of monetary and ﬁscal policy disap-
pear and real allocations approach the Ramsey steady state, independently of
the policy arrangement in place.13 As a result, the welfare gains from monetary
commitment disappear, see the case with θ =0 .1 reported in table 3.
Moreover, table 3 illustrates that the ﬁndings are also robust to changing
t h ed e g r e eo fc o m p e t i t i o n( η = −5,−7)a n dt oa s s u m i n gﬁscal expenditure to
be in part socially wasteful (x =0 .02).
However, results are sensitive to assuming diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion.
In particular, when the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion falls below one, the
12For each parameterization in table 4 we choose ω0 and ω1 such that the Ramsey steady
state is identical to the one emerging in the baseline calibration. When considering ﬁscal
waste we parameterize the model in a way that in steady state the overall ﬁscal spending
g + x remains unchanged compared to the baseline calibration.
13The steady state inﬂation rate, however, does not converge to zero as θ → 0.I n s t e a d ,
numerical simulation show that Π approaches a value of approximately 1.18. Inﬂation becomes
costless in the ﬂexible price limit but it is required to eliminate the ﬁscal spending bias
emerging under price stability, see the discussion in section 4.2.1.
17ﬁscal spending bias becomes more and more severe. This induces a committed
monetary authority to implement higher and higher rates of inﬂation, so as
to restrain ﬁscal spending. For σ =0 .4 the committing monetary authority
implements approximately the same rate of inﬂation as a sequential monetary
policymaker. SFP then generates roughly the same welfare level as SMFP, see
table 3. For even lower values of risk aversion, e.g., σ =0 .35, the equilibrium
inﬂation rate falls when relaxing monetary commitment. It then seems unlikely
that monetary conservatism would be able to improve welfare. Such degrees
of relative risk aversion, however, seem to lie on the lower end of plausible
values. Moreover, our model tends to understate the overall size of the monetary
inﬂation bias arising from sequential monetary policymaking, since it abstracts
from the presence of nominal debt. We may conjecture that once the existence
of nominal debt is taken into account, equilibrium inﬂation always increases
when relaxing monetary commitment.
7 Conservative Central Bank
This section analyzes whether the steady state distortions stemming from se-
quential monetary and ﬁscal decisions can be reduced if the central bank is more
inﬂation averse than society. Svensson (1997) and Rogoﬀ (1985) have shown that
an appropriately conservative central bank eliminates the steady state distor-
tions from lack of monetary commitment when ﬁscal policy is assumed to be
exogenous.
We consider a ‘weight conservative’ monetary policymaker along the lines of












where α ≥ 0 is a measure of monetary conservatism. For α>0 the monetary
authority dislikes inﬂation (and deﬂation) more than society.
Replacing the objective function of the sequential monetary policy prob-
lem (20) with the conservative objective (26), one can then use the ﬁrst order



































For α =0this monetary reaction function reduces to the one without conser-
vatism (MRF). As before, MRF-C implies that current interest rates depend
18on current economic conditions only, which validates the conjecture that future
policy choices can be taken as given in a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium.
7.1 Fiscal Commitment
We ﬁrst consider the case with ﬁscal commitment and a sequential yet conser-
vative central bank. The ﬁscal authority rationally anticipates the conservative
monetary reaction function (MRF-C), which implies that the ﬁscal policy prob-






βtu(ct,h t,g t) (27)
s.t.
Equations (11),(12),(15),(MRF-C) for all t
Rt ≥ 1 for all t
We thus proposes the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 6 (SCMP) As e l f - c o n ﬁrming equilibrium with sequential and con-
servative monetary policy and ﬁscal commitment is a sequence {ct,h t,Πt,R t,g t}∞
t=0
solving problem (27).
A steady state with SCMP is again deﬁned as the limit for t →∞of the
self-conﬁrming equilibrium with SCMP.
Figure 1 depicts the welfare losses associated with various degrees of mone-
tary conservatism α for the baseline calibration in section 5. For large values of
α the welfare losses disappear and the steady state with SCMP approaches the
Ramsey steady state. For α →∞the conservative monetary reaction function
(MRF-C) becomes consistent with the Ramsey steady state, since the Lagrange
multiplier associated with MRF-C in problem (27) approaches zero.14 As a
result, for α →∞the ﬁscal authority’s policy problem (27) approaches the
Ramsey problem (16).15 In a setting with ﬁscal commitment, a suﬃciently
conservative central bank thus eliminates the steady state distortions stemming
from lack of monetary commitment.
7.2 Sequential Fiscal Policy
We now consider the case with sequential monetary and ﬁscal policy. Since the
monetary and ﬁscal authorities now pursue diﬀerent objectives, it matters for
the equilibrium outcome whether ﬁscal policy is determined before, after, or
simultaneously with monetary policy. It remains to be ascertained, however,
14This holds only from a ‘steady state’ or ‘timeless’ perspective. Initially, the Lagrange
multiplier associated with MRF-C in (27) is non-zero.
15See the previous footnote.
19which of these timing structures is the most relevant one for actual economies.
While it might take long to implement ﬁscal policies, the time lag between a
monetary policy decision and its eﬀect on the economy can also be substantial.
We thus consider Nash as well as leadership equilibria.
7.2.1 Deﬁning Nash and Leadership Equilibria
This section deﬁnes the various equilibria then brieﬂy discusses them. For the
case with simultaneous decisions we propose the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 7 (SCMFP-Nash) A Markov-perfect equilibrium with sequential
and conservative monetary policy, sequential ﬁscal policy and simultaneous pol-
icy decisions is a sequence {ct,h t,Πt,R t,g t}∞
t=0 solving (11), (12), (15), (FRF),
and (MRF-C).
Next, consider the case with monetary leadership. The conservative mone-
tary authority then has to take into account the ﬁscal reaction function (FRF).















Equations (11),(12),(15),(FRF) for all t
Et (ct+j,h t+j,Πt+j,g t+j,R t+j) given for j ≥ 1
Rt+j ≥ 1 for all j ≥ 0
Eliminating Lagrange multipliers from the ﬁrst order conditions of problem (28)
delivers the conservative monetary reaction function with monetary leadership
that we denote by (MRF-C-ML).
Deﬁnition 8 (SCMFP-ML) A Markov-perfect equilibrium with sequential and
conservative monetary policy, sequential ﬁscal policy and monetary policy de-
ciding before ﬁscal policy is a sequence {ct,h t,Πt,R t,g t}∞
t=0 solving (11), (12),
(15), (FRF), and (MRF-C-ML).
Finally, we consider the case with ﬁscal leadership. Fiscal policy must then






βju(ct+j,h t+j,g t+j) (29)
s.t.
Equations (11),(12),(15), (MRF-C) for all t
Et (ct+j,h t+j,Πt+j,g t+j,R t+j) given for j ≥ 1
Rt+j ≥ 1 for all j ≥ 0
20Solving for the ﬁrst order conditions of problem (29) and eliminating Lagrange
multipliers delivers the ﬁscal reaction function in the presence of a conservative
monetary authority and ﬁscal leadership that we denote by (FRF-C-FL).
Deﬁnition 9 (SCMFP-FL) A Markov-perfect equilibrium with sequential and
conservative monetary policy, sequential ﬁscal policy, and ﬁscal policy deciding
before monetary policy is a sequence {ct,h t,Πt,R t,g t}∞
t=0 solving (11), (12),
(15), (FRF-C-FL), and (MRF-C).
As before, the steady states corresponding to the equilibrium deﬁnitions 7,
8, and 9 are deﬁned as the stationary values (c,h,Π,R,g) solving the equations
listed in the respective deﬁnitions.
We now brieﬂy comment on the previous deﬁnitions. First, note that for
the case α =0all three equilibria reduce to the one emerging under SMFP
without conservatism: MRF-C and MRF-C-ML are then identical to MRF and
FRF-C-FL is identical to FRF. Second, for the Nash and monetary leadership
cases, there exists a theoretical upper bound on the welfare gains that mone-
tary conservatism is able to generate. Since in these cases the ﬁscal authority
takes monetary decisions as given, welfare maximizing monetary behavior is the
one consistent with the self-conﬁrming equilibrium with sequential ﬁscal policy
(SFP) considered in section 4.2.1. Third, in the case with ﬁscal leadership, the
ﬁscal authority anticipates the monetary reaction function and conservatism can
then lead outcomes that are welfare superior outcomes to the one emerging with
SFP.
7.2.2 The Implications of Central Bank Conservatism
Figure 2 displays the welfare gains associated with diﬀerent degrees of monetary
conservatism under the various leadership assumptions for the baseline calibra-
tion in section 5. The upper and lower horizontal lines shown in the ﬁgure
indicate the welfare losses associated with SFP and SMFP, respectively.
For α =0 , i.e., the case without any monetary conservatism, all equilibria
deliver the welfare losses associated with SMFP. This is just a restatement of
the fact that the leadership structure does not matter when both policymakers
pursue the same objectives.
With SCMFP-Nash and SCMFP-ML we ﬁnd that an appropriately conser-
vative central bank can fully recover the steady state associated with monetary
commitment and sequential ﬁscal policy (SFP). The Nash and the monetary
leadership equilibria thus suggest that the gains from monetary conservatism
can be substantial and that one can fully recover the welfare losses resulting
from lack of monetary commitment with an appropriate degree of monetary
conservatism. Interestingly, the costs associated with being overly conservative
appear small, while an insuﬃcient degree of conservatism may result in large
welfare losses. The intuition for this ﬁnding is provided below.
21The case for a conservative monetary authority is even stronger with SCMFP-
FL. As shown in ﬁgure 2, a conservative monetary authority then not only
eliminates the welfare losses from sequential monetary decisions but also those
emerging from lack of ﬁscal commitment. In the limiting case of α →∞mone-
tary conservatism fully recovers the Ramsey steady state.
Fiscal leadership diﬀers from the Nash and monetary leadership cases be-
cause the ﬁscal authority anticipates the within-period oﬀ-equilibrium behavior
of the conservative monetary authority. For α →∞the monetary authority is
determined to implement price stability at all costs. A ﬁscal expansion above
the Ramsey spending level, which generates inﬂation, then triggers a strong
increase in interest rates so as to reduce private consumption. Thus, in this
setting the ﬁscal authority anticipates that ﬁscal spending results in a crowding
out of private consumption and this disciplines the ﬁscal authority’s behavior.
Figure 3 displays the steady state values associated with various degrees of
monetary conservatism for the diﬀerent timing assumptions. While monetary
conservatism unambiguously reduces the inﬂation bias, its eﬀect on the ﬁscal
spending bias depends on whether or not ﬁscal policy anticipates the monetary
policy decision. If ﬁscal policy takes the monetary decision as given, monetary
conservatism results in an increased ﬁscal spending bias for the reasons discussed
in section 4.2.1. This explains why in the Nash and monetary leadership cases
an overly conservative central bank reduces welfare, see ﬁgure 2. The gains
from lowering inﬂation at some point start to be outweighed by the losses from
increased ﬁscal spending and the resulting crowding out of private consumption.
Figure 3 also explains why insuﬃcient monetary conservatism is rather costly
in welfare terms, while an overly conservative central bank does not cause much
welfare losses in the Nash and monetaryl e a d e r s h i pc a s e s .W i t ht o om u c hm o n -
etary conservatism, the public spending increase and the resulting crowding out
of private consumption roughly oﬀset each other in utility terms. At the same
time, there are large initial welfare gains from monetary conservatism, which
arise from correcting the monetary inﬂation bias. Unlike in the case with exoge-
nous ﬁscal policy, however, the inﬂation bias has to be deﬁned as the inﬂation
increase associated with a transition from the SFP regime to the SMFP regime.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper analyzes monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions in a dynamic general
equilibrium model when policymakers lack the ability to credibly commit to
policies ex-ante.
It is shown that lack of ﬁscal commitment leads to excessive ﬁscal spending
on public goods while lack of monetary commitment results in the well-known
inﬂation bias. The welfare losses generated by lack of monetary or ﬁscal com-
mitment appear to be substantial. In the absence of monetary commitment,
22independently of whether or not ﬁscal policy can commit, making the monetary
authority appropriately conservative completely eliminates the steady state dis-
tortions associated with sequential monetary policy. The case for a conservative
monetary authority is even stronger because monetary conservatism may also
eliminate the steady state losses associated with lack of ﬁscal commitment.
A number of important questions remain to be addressed in further research.
First, the paper considers steady state eﬀects only. In a fully stochastic model,
however, welfare losses also depend on the conditional response to shocks. Ex-
ploring the eﬀects of monetary conservatism on these policy responses seems
to be of interest. Second, the paper abstracts from capital stock and govern-
ment bond dynamics, which would allow for additional interactions between
policymakers. We plan to extend the analysis to such richer settings in future
work.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose the steady state inﬂation rate is given by Π ∈ [β,β−1].F o rβ suﬃciently












Monopolistic competition implies w<1.S i n c eτ ≥ 0, it follows that 1 − w(1 −
τ) 6=0 , which shows that MRF cannot be satisﬁed for a steady state inﬂations
rate Π ∈ [β,β−1],p r o v i d e dβ is suﬃciently close to one. The Euler equation
(12) and the constraint R ≥ 1 imply that Π ≥ β in any steady state. Thus, it
must be that Π >β −1 > 1, as claimed.
A.2 Utility Parameters and Ramsey Steady State
Here we show how the utility parameters ω0 and ω1 are determined by the
Ramsey steady state values. Let variables without subscripts denote their steady




















t be the Lagrange multipliers associated with (11), (12), and (15),
respectively, in problem (16). The ﬁrst order condition (FOC) of (16) with
respect to Rt implies
γ2 =0 (33)
The FOC with respect to ct together with equations (31) and (33) deliver
c−σ + γ1 hω0ησ
(1 − h)c
− γ3 =0 (34)













+ γ3 =0 (35)










γ3 = c−σ + γ1 hω0ησ
(1 − h)c
(37)
From the FOC with respect to gt it then follows that
ω1 = g(γ3 − γ1c−ση) (38)
Given steady state values for c,h,g and x consistent with the resource constraint
(15), equations (32), and (36)-(38) determine ω0 and ω1.
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26Variable Assigned Value
discount factor β =0 .9913
elasticity of demand η = −6
adjustment cost parameter θ =1 7 .5
elasticity of substitution σ =1
utility weight on leisure ω0 =4 .16
utility weight on the public good ω1 =0 .2755
ﬁscal waste x =0
Table 1: Baseline calibration
Policy chg Π τ Welfare equivalent
regime (percentage deviations relative to Ramsey) (level) consumption losses
SFP -16.6% 0.7% 55.0% 2.6% 36.8% -6.5%
SMP 5.9% 10.5% -16.9% 4.6% 17.9% -7.6%
SMFP -6.6% 14.8% 29.6% 5.7% 26.9% -11.0%
Table 2: Steady state eﬀects
27Welfare equivalent
consumption losses ΠSMFP − ΠSFP
SFP SMP SMFP
Baseline calibration -6.5% -7.6% -11.0% 3.1%
more sticky prices (θ =2 5 ) -6.8% -8.2% -11.9% 2.8%
less sticky prices (θ =1 0 ) -5.8% -6.6% -9.5% 3.5%
almost ﬂexible prices (θ =0 .1) -0.5% -0.5% -0.6% 2.0%
more competition (η = −7) -4.6% -6.2% -8.7% 2.9%
less competition (η = −5) -9.8% -9.4% -14.2% 2.8%
ﬁscal waste (x =0 .02) -3.0% -7.8% -9.5% 4.3%
higher risk aversion (σ =2 ) -1.2% -3.3% -4.2% 2.9%
lower risk aversion (σ =0 .4) -37.2% -19.8% -37.2% 0.0%
very low risk aversion (σ =0 .35) -43.8% -22.4% -45.4% -0.6%
Table 3: Robustness of steady state eﬀects










Consumption loss relative to Ramsey SS



















Figure 1: Welfare gains from monetary conservatism with ﬁscal commitment
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Figure 2: Welfare gains from monetary conservatism with sequential ﬁscal policy























































Figure 3: The eﬀects of central bank conservatism
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